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A Case Study of Self-Checking Circuits Reliability
JIEN-CHUNG LO
Department ofElectrical and Computer Engineering, The University ofRhode lsland, Kingston, RI 02881-0805
In this paper, we analyze the reliability of self-checking circuits. A case study is presented
in which a fault-tolerant system with duplicated self-checking modules is compared
to the TMR version. It is shown that a duplicated self-checking system has a much higher
reliability than that ofthe TMR counterpart. More importantly, the reliability of the self-
checking system does not drop as sharply as that of the TMR version. We also
demonstrate the trade-offs between hardware complexity and error handling capability
of self-checking circuits. Alternative self-checking designs where some hardware
redundancies are removed with the lost of fault-secure and/or self-testing properties
are also studied.
Keywords: Alternative self-checking designs, Duplicated self-checking systems, Reliability analysis,
Self-checking circuits, Triple modulo redundancy, Totally self-checking goal
1 INTRODUCTION
The need for self-checking circuits increases as the
development of VLSI pushes for lower circuit
dimension and higher packaging density. It is well
known that these features will make VLSI chips
even more vulnerable to transient and soft errors.
Concurrent error detecting mechanism is required
for a reliable operation.
The self-checking circuits have been widely
studied[1-3]. They are designed to perform concur-
rent error detection in safety critical applications.
However, the designers of self-checking circuits
and/or systems are more concentrate on the satis-
faction of a given set of definitions than the desired
application environment and the nature of the
mission. In other words, all existing self-checking
circuits or checkers have been designed to guarantee
the extreme case error handling capability.
373
There is no one single rule for fault-tolerant com-
puting system design. The main reason is that a
fault-tolerant system must be built to fit the targeted
applications. For example, FTMP[4] and SIFTIs]
are designed for avionics systems. The requirement
is to achieve an ultra-reliability, 1-10-9 within a
short flight time (about 10 hours on average). The
electronic switching system (ESS)[61, on the other
hand, is designed to achieve a high availability. It is
no surprise that the design techniques of the above
mentioned three systems differ significantly.
Obviously, many possible self-checking circuit
designs have yet to be explored. Take totally self-
checking (TSC) circuits [2] for example, aTSC circuit
must guarantee that no error propagation before a
fault detection and that all modeled faults can be
detected eventually. The TSC definitions set a very
strict standard for high degree of error handling
capability. This supreme error handling capability
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has been termed TSC goal[3]. However, this level of
error protection comes with a cost of high redun-
dancy. One may easily see that the redundancy level
of a TSC design can be reduced at a cost of losing
the level of error protection, in[7’8], we proposed to
calculate the probability that a circuit achieves the
TSC goal. This probability can then be used to
determine the worthiness of a modification that
attempts to reduce the redundancy.
When we use a measurement rather than a set
ofrestricted definitions to evaluate self-checking
designs, we may freely explore a wide spectrum
of design possibilities. Moreover, a self-checking
design that is optimally (or near optimally) tuned
for the given application environment can be
obtained. In this paper, we present a case study
of reliability analysis of self-checking circuits. We
will present the evaluation ofa self-checking system
consists of dual self-checking modules. The dupli-
cation of self-checking module provides the con-
current error correction capability and can ensure
the continuous operations. This is similar to the
stepwise negotiating voting[9]. We compare the
reliability of this design to the triple modulo redun-
dancy (TMR) version that can provide the same
capability. Moreover, we demonstrate the impact
of a design alternative that trades some error
handling capability for a lower hardware redun-
dancy level.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Definitions
In this paper, we define defects as the abnormality
in physical layer, e.g. bridges and breaks. Thefaults
are the abstract view of classifiable defects, e.g.
stuck-at, stuck-open and stuck-on faults. The errors
are the erroneous pattern shown at the output of
the circuit in the presence of physical abnormality.
A failure is defined here as the situation where
errors are propagated beyond the boundary of the
circuit. This is in accordance with the conventional
TSC definitions.
TSC circuits and checkers have been formally
defined as follows[2]:
D 1: A circuit isfault-secure with respect to fault set
F, if and only if for every single fault and for
all code word input the circuit will never
produce an incorrect code word.
D2" A circuit is self-testing with respect to fault set
17, if and only if each fault in 17 can be detected
by at least one code word input.
D3" A circuit is totally self-checking if it satisfies
D1 and D2.
The TSC goal is stated as follows[3]" "Given the
fault assumption, a self-checking circuit always
produces a noncode word as the first erroneous
output due to a fault." The TSC circuits achieve
TSC goal given the following two assumptions[3]:
Al: Each failure can be modeled as a member of
the predefined fault set.
A2: Faults occur one at a time, and the time
interval between the occurrences of any two
faults is sufficiently long so that all input code
words are applied to the circuit input.
To satisfy A1, the design must have a 100% fault
coverage with respect to the predefined fault set.
However, this predefined fault set may not neces-
sarily include all the possible faults. As for A2, we
can see that a 100% guarantee of TSC goal is
virtually impossible. The time interval between the
occurrences of any two faults is a random variable
governed by the component failure rate. Since it is
a random variable, there is no guarantee that A2
can always be satisfied. The problem is even worse
for embedded TSC circuits when some crucial
input vectors are not available. These drawbacks
are well-known for the TSC circuits.
Strictly speaking, a TSC circuit is no longer TSC
when it uses an error control code that is incapable
of correcting or detecting all possible error types.
Also, a TSC circuit is no longer TSC when it is
placed in an embedded environment where the
possible code word combinations are insufficient to
detect all modeled faults. In such cases, we simply
call the circuits self-checking (SC).
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2.2 Previous Works
In[1], the reliability of a duplicated self-checking
system is compared to that of a triple modulo
redundancy (TMR) system. This analysis assumes
a perfect coverage, i.e. no violation of the TSC
assumptions may occur. In this paper, we study the
reliability comparison using similar configurations.
The difference is that, in this paper, the coverage
will be included in the reliability evaluations. The
coverage is estimated based on the error handling
capability of the self-checking circuit.
In most self-checking studies, the size of the
minimum test set has been used to compare the self-
checking designs. This can be justified from the
close examination of the TSC assumptions. How-
ever, we need something more concrete to ascertain
the dynamic fault and/or error handling perform-
ance of the TSC circuits. Only a handful of related
works regarding the performance of TSC circuits
have been reported in the literature[11-14’7]. The
study by Courtois[11] formulates the performance
of partially self-checking systems. The TSC circuits
are assumed to be governed by a simple failure
mechanism.
The studies of Lu and McCluskey[12] and
Fujiwara eta/. [13’14] are aimed at the static behavior
rather than run-time behavior of self-checking
circuits. Ref. [12] presents two quantitative meas-
ures: TIF (test input fraction) and SIF (secure
input fraction) to describe the figure of merit for
TSC circuits. Ref. [13,14] suggested a measure
called checker fault coverage (CFC) to describe
the fault detection capability of a TSC circuit.
These measurements are inadequate to describe the
run-time behavior of a self-checking circuit.
Recently, Lo and Fujiwara[7] present a proba-
bilistic measurement for TSC circuits. This mea-
surement provides a steady-state probability, i.e.
this measurement is not a function of time, of the
run-time behavior. In[8], the formula to derive the
similar measurement as a function of time is pre-
sented. Although some of the derivations in[8] are
useful for the reliability analysis, the emphasis of [8]
is mainly in the probability to achieve the TSC goal
itself. There is no further elaboration on the
application of such probability to the reliability
analysis of self-checking circuits.
RELIABILITY MODELING OF
SELF-CHECKING CIRCUITS
Figure shows self-checking system model studied
in this paper. Since a self-checking system provides
only the concurrent error detecting capability, we
need two self-checking system for concurrent error
correction. The correct output is selected based
on the error indication signals from the two self-
checking checkers.
3.1 Notations
The TSC goal[3] has been proposed as a measure
of all self-checking circuits given the two fault
assumptions[3]. Conventionally, a self-checking cir-
cuit must achieve the TSC goal. However, in this
paper, we shall use a more relaxed definition and
name any circuit that is designed with inherent
concurrent error detection capability a self-check-
ing circuit.
The followings are the notations to be used in the
derivations.
N: Total number of faults in the circuit. F=
{fl,..., fN}.
M: The circuit is fault-secure with respect to FS-
{fl,..., fM}, O<_M<_N.
Ai: The failure rate per cycle off,., _< _< N.
Ti: Detecting rate off,. per cycle.
Qi: 1-Ti.
For simplexity, we use the single stuck-at fault
model. If a more realistic fault model is to be
considered, we need to address the fact that some
faults such as stuck-open faults need two tests in
sequence. We also assume a synchronous circuit
operation. The cycle time will be used as the unit of
calculations.
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FIGURE The architecture of the reliability case study.
3.2 Reliability Derivation
Conventionally, reliability ofa self-checking should
be defined as the probability that no fault occur
before or on the th cycle, and thus
R(t) e-Nat. (1)
Using the terminology of[15]:, we shall call this
the real reliability. The apparent reliability of a self-
checking circuit is defined as the probability that
the self-checking circuit is still operational at the th
cycle. When a single fault occurs in a self-checking
circuits, the circuit will remain operational until the
fault detection occurs if the circuit is fault-secure
with respect to that fault.
Figure 2 depicts the possible scenarios of a self-
checking circuit at the th cycle. We define two
functions: SC(t) and UN(t) to represent the
probability of the two cases where a fault occurs
and the TSC goal is secured. The derivations of
these two functions will be addressed later.
The TSC goal is said lost when either (1) a
second fault occurs before the first fault is detected;
or (2) the circuit is not fault-secure with respect to
the first fault. In the former case, the TSC goal is
lost as soon as the second fault occurs. For the later
case, the TSC goal is lost as soon as the first fault
occurs.
In a duplicated system, such as the one shown in
Figure 1, we also need to calculate the probability
of a successful error correction. The system is
considered reliable if the error is correctly identi-
fied and the correction is also correctly performed.
Conventionally, the reliability of a duplicated sys-
tem may be formulated as
Rd(t) R2(t)+ 2CR(t)(1 R(t)). (2)
[1The coverage 6] C, is defined in this case the
probability of a successful error correction. Note
that C may be a ffnction of time also. For the
system shown in Figure 1, we may see that UN(t)
represents a counterpart of the term C(1-R(t)) in a
2See example 3.25, pp. 164 oft151.
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fault-free: R(t)
TSC goal is secured
faulty
TSC goal is lost
fault has not been detected: SC(t)
fault has been detected: UN(O
FIGURE 2 The four possible states of a self-checking circuit at the th cycle.
conventional duplicated system. Therefore, the
reliability of the duplicated self-checking system is
Raup(t) R2a(t) + 2UN(t)Ra(t).
However, since a self-checking functional circuit
must always be accompanied by a self-checking
checker, we need to adjust the above formula. First
the apparent reliability of the combinational of a
self-checking circuit and a self-checking checker is
Ra-sc(t) Ra-f (t)Ra-c(t), (3)
where Ra_f is the apparent reliability of the self-
checking functional circuit and R,_c is that of the
self-checking checker. As for the probability of
a successful error correction given that a single
fault occurs for the combination of a self-checking
functional circuit and a self-checking checker, we
find
UNsc(t) UNf(t)Ra-c(t) + UNc(t)Ra-f(t)
+ UNf(t) UNc(t). (4)
Therefore, the reliability of the duplicated self-
checking system shown in Figure is
Rdup-sc(t) R 2 (t) + 2UNsc(t)Ra-c(t)a-sc
For a even more detailed analysis, the reliability
of the multiplexer in Figure is also taken into
account. Therefore,
Rdul -sc(t) Rmux(t)(R2a_sc(t) + 2UNsc(t)Ra-sc (t))
(5)
gives a more accurate reliability measurement.
3.3 Derivation of Ra(t)
The following equations have also been presented
in[8]. However, since the measurement of interest
in[81 is the probability to achieve the TSC goal, the
formula is provided for S(t)= SC(t)+ UN(t). The
SC(t) and UN(t) have never been separately
derived.
The apparent reliability of a self-checking circuit
can be computed as follows.
Ra(t) R(t) + SC(t)
M
e-NAt
-k E Ae-NAtiot-j+l
i=1 j=l
M t+l
e_NAt
_[_ Ae_NAt (ai Oi (6)
i=l Ti
We assume that all faults have equal arrival rate
and are governed by exponential distribution law.
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We note that,
SC(t) P(achieve TSC goal without a detection)
P(the first fault occurs at the jth cycle)
j=l
x P(no other fault occurs between the jth
and the th cycles)
x P(the first fault is not yet detected at
the th cycle) (7)
In the above equation, the assumption is that the
TSC goal is lost whenever a second fault occurs.
This is not suitable for circuits designed as strongly
fault-secure (SFS)[3] or strongly code disjoint
(SCD)[17]. The reliability analysis of SFS and
SCD designs will require the explicit study of the
fault sequences instead of faults.
Since
P(the first fault occurs at the jth cycle)
P(a fault occurs at the jth cycle)
x P(this fault does not occur in any other
cycle before the jth cycle)
x P(the rest of the faults do not occur
before or on the jth cycle)
Ae-A x e-A(t-1) X e-(N-1)Aj
Ae-’(t-j) x e-Naj,
P(no other fault occurs between the jth and
the th cycles)
e-(N-1)A(t-j)
(8)
(9)
and
Ti =0. We may easily see that this fault will not
contribute to the SC(t) at all. In other words, we
also assume that the TSC goal is lost whenever a
non-self-testing fault occurs. We should remark
here that this is a worst case assumption.
3.4 Derivation of UN(t)
The UN(t) of a self-checking circuit can be formu-
lated as follows.
M
UN(t) Z P(fi occurs at the jth cycle)
i=1 j=l
P(no other fault occurs before or
on the jth cycle)
(-- P( J5 is detected at the kth cycle)
k=j
P(no other fault occurs between the
jth cycle and the kth cycle)). (1 1)
We assume here that at each cycle each input has
the same probability of occurrence. Therefore, the
probability that f. occurs at the jth cycle and is
detected at the kth cycle, k < j, is (1-Ti)k-JTi T is
the probability thatfi can be detected at each cycle.
In other words, Ti is the sum of arrival rates of
all code word inputs that test fi. Since the fault
detection occurs at the k th cycle, there are k-j
cycles the circuit receives inputs that cannot detect
jS. In other words, the detection of a fault is a
geometric distribution.
e(y5 is detected at the k th cycle) Q JTi. (12)
The discussions given above and in the previous
section shows that
P(the first fault is not yet detected at
the th cycle)= Ol-j+l, (10)
we may easily verify Equation (6).
The non-fault-secure faults are excluded from the
derivation of SC(t). This implies that we consider
the TSCG goal is lost whenever a non-fault-secure
fault appears. If the circuit is not self-testing with
respect to a particular fault, say j, that fault has a
UN(t) Ae-(t-j e-Nj
i=lj=l \k=j e-A(k-J)
M
Z "{ e-A(t+l)e-NATi --e-Ae-NA(t+l)
i=l
x +
[(e-a-e-aQi)(e
-
e-a)] }. (13)
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4 A CALCULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we shall use the formulas presented
earlier to evaluate self-checking circuit designs. We
shall use the well-known parity encoded adder[18’9]
as an example.
4.1 A TSC Parity Encoded Adder
The parity encoded adders in[81 require duplicated
carry units to generate the redundant carry bits for
the calculation of the output parity bit. This is be-
cause some faults in the adder may induce multiple
unidirectional errors on the carry bits, which result
in arithmetic errors on the output bits. These errors
are undetectable by the parity code unless the
duplicated carry bits are provided. Figure 3 shows
a 4-bit parity encoded adder as in[18’9]. We assume
a single stuck-at fault model such that the fault set
consists of all possible single stuck-at faults. Table I
lists all the possible faults sorted by the number of
their test inputs. In this case, N 202, and M 202.
The Ti’s are computed assuming that each input
has equal probability of occurrence.
In order to clearly demonstrate the calculation of
Ti, we show in Table II the tests for each fault in a
full adder. The logic diagram with corresponding
node names of a full adder is shown in Figure 4.
TABLE Numbers of faults grouped by T;
for circuit in Figure 3
T
non-fault-secure 0
64/512 105
128/512 4
192/512 4
256/512 89
Total 202
fault X
TABLE II Complete tests for stuck-at faults of full adder in Figure 4
Y C; no. of tests fault X Y Ci no. of tests
a s-a-0
b s-a-0 X
c s-a-0 0
d s-a-0 X
e s-a-0 0
0
fs-a-0
g s-a-0
h s-a-0
s-a-0
j s-a-0 0
k s-a-0 0
s-a-0
m s-a-0
n s-a-0 0
o s-a-0
X X 4 a s-a-1 0 X
X 4 b s-a-1 X 0
X 4 c s-a-1 0 0
0 X
X 4 d s-a-1 X X
0 4 e s-a-1 0 0
0 0
0 0 0
0 fs-a-1 0 0
0 g s-a-1 0
0 h s-a-1 0
0 s-a-1 0
j s-a-1 0 0
k s-a-1 0
0 s-a-1 0 X
0 0
0
0 m s-a-1 0 0
0
0
n s-a-1 X 0
0 0
0
4 o s-a-1 0 0
0 0
X 0
X
X
X
X
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
X
0
0
0
0
X
0
0
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X3Y3 X2Y2 XIYI XOYO XpYpX2Y2 XIYI XOYOCi
$3 $2 Sl S0 Sp
FIGURE 3 The classical implementation of TSC parity
encoded adder with duplicated carry unit.
XY Ci
f
Co S
FIGURE 4 A gate level logic diagram of a full adder with
marked stuck-at faults.
X3Y3 X2Y2 X1Y1 XOYO Ci XpYp
$3 $2 S1 SO Sp
FIGURE 5 An alternative self-checking parity encoded adder
implementation without the duplicated carry unit.
TABLE III Numbers of faults grouped by Ti
for circuit in Figure 5
T,.
non-fault-secure 80
64/512 0
128/512 4
192/512 4
256/512 54
Total 142
4.2 A Self-Checking Parity Encoded Adder
The parity encoded adder in Figure 3 uses a dupli-
cated carry unit. This design is necessary to avoid
miss detection due to error propagation on the carry
chain[19]. A possible design alternative here is to
reduce the complexity by removing the duplicated
carry unit. The internal carry bits are used instead
to generate the output (sum) parity bit. This design
is no longer TSC and thus we will refer to it as self-
checking only. This self-checking adder is shown in
Figure 5.
Table III summaries all the possible stuck-at
faults in Figure 5. For this circuit, we find N 142
and M 62, because there are 80 non-fault-secure
faults. Obviously that this alternate design has
poorer error handling capability. However, we also
know that this alternate design has a reduced
hardware complexity or a smaller N. It should be
noted here that there is no direct relationship
between the degree of lost error handling capability
and the amount of hardware redundancy reduced.
4.3 Comparison
In this section, we compare the reliability of the
structure shown in Figure and its TMR counter-
part. The TSC parity adder and the self-checking
adder discussed previously will be used here. The
reliability of a TMR adder is
RTMR Rv(3R 2 2R 3) (14)
where R is the reliability of the voter.
Figure 6 shows the reliability plots of the dupli-
cated self-checking system with TSC parity adder
and the self-checking parity adder, respectively,
and that of a TMR adder. Note that the parity
checker associated with the parity encoded adder is
also taken into account.
First, we observe that the duplicated system with
TSC parity adder gives the highest reliability. Of
course, in this example, the TMR version uses the
highest level of hardware redundancy. The TSC
adder version uses 178 additional hardware unit
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(per fault), the self-checking adder uses 58 addi-
tional hardware unit, and the TMR version uses an
extra of 320 units. The above numbers include the
checkers, voters, and the multiplexers. We may
expect that the TSC duplicated system with TSC
components to always perform better than the
TMR version when the hardware redundancy level
is comparable. This can be observe from Figure 6
that the curve of the TMR version drops much
more rapidly.
As for the alternate self-checking design, we
know that the inherent reliability of the circuit is
increased due to the reduction of hardware com-
plexity. This is at a cost of losing a significant level
of error handling capability. We see from Table III
that 80 out of a total of 142 faults, or about 56%,
are non-fault-secure.
From Figure 6, we see the effect ofthis significant
lost of error handling capability. The reliability of
the self-checking alternative is clearly much lower
that that of the TSC. Nonetheless, we also see that
this self-checking alternative is not totally useless.
When NAt < 0.07, the reliability of the self-check-
ing version is only slightly lower than that of the
TMR version. When NAt > 0.07, the self-checking
version has a higher reliability than the TMR ver-
sion. More importantly, the gap between the two
reliabilities increases as NAt increases.
A fault-tolerant system is application oriented. A
good fault-tolerant design is a design that is opti-
mized for its application. If the application requires
that the system to have a reliability greater than 0.9
for NAt < 0.1, then obviously the self-checking
version is the best choice.
0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8-
O.75
0
-
1: reliability of duplicated T$C adder
:: reliability of duplicated self-checking adder
3: reliability ofTMR adder
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
N,t (N=202)
0.25
FIGURE 6 The reliability of a duplicated system with TSC parity encoded adders, a duplicated system with self-checking parity
encoded adders, and a TMR system with triplicated adders and voter.
382 JIEN-CHUNG LO
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented in this paper the reliability
analysis of self-checking systems. We also show
that alternate design method can be justified based
on the reliability modeling rather than the theo-
retical soundness. The evaluations shown in this
paper give the worst case numbers. The reason is
that we assume the fault-secure property is lost
whenever: (1) a non-fault-secure fault occurs or
(2) a second fault occurs before the first fault is
detected. Obviously, the reliability derived based
on these assumptions is lower than the realistic
reliability. Even if a non-fault-secure fault occurs
as the first fault, the fault-secure property is lost
only when the appropriate code word input is also
presented. Further, a self-checking circuit may
exhibit SFS and/or SCD properties for some fault
sequences. A circuit is SFS or SCD if and only if
all fault sequence is SFS or SCD. In this case, the
presented derivation under estimates the proba-
bility that the fault-secure property is still intact.
For a more accurate estimation of self-checking
reliability, we must handle these two cases explic-
itly. The first case can be easily incorporated by
counting the probability of losing fault-secure
property for each non-fault-secure fault and use it
in the equation. This probability can be derived as
a ratio of the number of code word inputs that the
circuit will not lost the fault-secure property. To
cope with the second case, one must analyze in
detail all possible fault sequences for their fault-
secureness implications, as we have pointed out in
Section 3.3. These will be the subjects of future
studies.
Finally, we point out an important implication
of this work is that a self-checking design that does
not guarantee to be fault-secure and/or self-testing
can still be used in some applications. After all, the
optimal fault-tolerant design is the one that has
been optimized for the given application. This is an
important consideration that should be included in
the self-checking circuits research.
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